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I.  Introduction.
  The celebrated Taylor (1993) rule posits that the central bank uses a fairly simple
interest rate rule when conducting monetary policy.  This rule is a reaction function
linking movements in the nominal interest rate to movements in inflation and other
endogenous variables.  Recently there has been a considerable amount of interest in
ensuring that such rules do no harm.  The problem is that by following a rule in which the
central bank responds to endogenous variables, it increases the likelihood that the central
bank introduces real indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria into an otherwise determinate
economy.  These sunspot fluctuations are welfare-reducing and can potentially be quite
large.
  The recent literature on determinacy and Taylor rules is voluminous including
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001a,b), Bernanke and Woodford (1997),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000,2001ab), Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000), Dupor (2001) and
Kerr and King (1996).  These papers typically analyze either an economy with perfectly
flexible prices or impose Calvo-style (1983) staggered pricing on the economy.  One
peculiarity of the Calvo pricing assumption is that it does not satisfy the natural rate
hypothesis (NRH).  That is, the central bank can permanently increase output by
engineering an ever-increasing inflation rate.
  The novelty of the current paper is to focus on a sticky price model that does
satisfy the NRH.  This paper demonstrates that in a NRH model a necessary and sufficient
condition for real determinacy is for the corresponding flexible price economy to have
both real and nominal determinacy.  This implies that in a NRH model a necessary and2
sufficient condition for real determinacy is for the monetary authority to react
aggressively to past movements in inflation.  This result is in contrast to a Calvo style
model in which current-looking interest rate rules are typically determinate.  The paper
also demonstrates that the sunspot equilibria that arise in NRH models are typically
learnable in the sense of E-stability.
II.  The Basic Model
The economy consists of numerous households and firms. Since we are concerned
with issues of determinacy without loss of generality we limit the discussion to a
deterministic model.  As is well known, if the deterministic dynamics are not unique, then
it is possible to construct sunspot equilibria in the model economy.  We make two further
simplifying assumptions.  First, we follow the convention of abstracting from capital
accumulation as the point we wish to make is independent of the investment margin.
1
Second, we assume linear preferences over leisure.  The results of Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2000,2001b) suggest that this comes with little loss of generality.
Households are identical and infinitely-lived with preferences over






where β is the personal discount rate, ct is consumption, at ≡ At/Pt is real cash balances
available for transactions during time t, Pt is the price level, and 1-Lt is leisure. The utility
function is given by U(c,1-L) ≡ V(c,a) – L.
                                                          
1 Carlstsrom and Fuerst (2000,2001b) and Dupor (2001) explore the effects of investment spending on the
determinacy conditions.3
The household begins the period with Mt cash balances and Bt-1 holdings of
nominal bonds.  Before proceeding to the goods market, the household visits the financial
market where it carries out bond trading and receives a cash transfer of  ) 1 ( − t
s
t G M
from the monetary authority where 
s
t M denotes the per capita money supply and Gt is the




t. Hence, before entering goods trading, the
household has nominal cash balances given by
  t t t t
s
t t t B R B G M M A − + − + ≡ − − 1 1 ) 1 ( ,
  where Rt-1 denotes the gross nominal interest rate from t-1 to t.  Notice that following
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000a) we utilize cash-in-advance (CIA) timing.
2   After engaging
in goods trading, the household ends the period with cash balances given by the
intertemporal budget constraint
, 1 t t t t t t t t c P L w P A M Π + − + = +
where the real wage is given by wt and Πt denotes the profit flow from firms.
As for firm behavior, we follow Yun (1996) and utilize a model of imperfect
competition in the intermediate goods market.  Final goods production in this economy is
carried out in a perfectly competitive industry that utilizes intermediate goods in
production. Intermediate goods firms are monopolist producers of differentiated
intermediate goods.  Each intermediate firm hires labor from households and utilizes a
linear production function denoted by f(L) = L. Imperfect competition implies that factor
payments are distorted, wt = zt where zt is marginal cost.


























t U t U
R
P










) ( ) (
(3)
t t L c = (4)
Using the assumed functional forms, and inserting the labor margin (1) and money
demand curve (3) into the Fisher equation (2) yields:
t t t t z z R ~ ~ ~ ~
1 1 1 − = − + + + π (5)
where πt ≡ Pt/Pt-1 and the tildes denote log deviations from the steady-state.  The system is
defined by the behavior of marginal cost and the nominal interest rate.
The behavior of marginal cost is determined by our assumptions on how the
intermediate goods are priced.  Below we consider two possibilities: a Calvo (1983)
model of forever stickiness, and a NRH model with finite stickiness.
As for the nominal rate, we assume a central bank reaction function where the
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2 The alternative to CIA timing is cash-when-I’m-done-timing where At = Mt+1.5
We consider three variations of this simple rule: i=-1 is a backward-looking rule, i=0 is a
current-looking rule, and i=1 is a forward-looking rule.  Under any such interest rate
policy the money supply responds endogenously to be consistent with the interest rate
rule.  It is this endogeneity that leads to the possibility of indeterminacy.
III.  Equilibrium Determinacy.
There are two types of indeterminacy that may arise.  First, there is nominal
indeterminacy—are the initial values of the price level and other nominal variables
pinned down?  In our notation this corresponds to the question of whether πt ≡ Pt/Pt-1 is
determined (where t is the initial time period).  This nominal indeterminacy is of no
consequence in and of itself, but is important only if it leads to real indeterminacy.  By
real indeterminacy, we mean a situation in which the behavior of one or more real
variables is not pinned down by the model.  This arises when the model does not pin
down the behavior of the nominal interest rate and/or marginal cost.
Real Indeterminacy with Forever Stickiness.
Following Calvo (1983), assume that each period a fraction of firms get to set a
new price, while the remaining fraction must charge the previous period’s price times
steady-state inflation.  This probability of a price change is constant across time and is
independent of how long it has been since any one firm has last adjusted its price.  Yun
(1996) demonstrates that in this case we have the following “Phillips curve”
1
~ ~ ~
+ + = t t t z π β λ π .( 7 )
Along an arbitrary deterministic path for inflation  t z ~  need never equal zero, ie., zt need
never equal z  < 1, the steady-state monopolistic competition distortion. This pricing
arrangement does not satisfy the NRH as there are deterministic inflation paths that will6
keep  t z ~  > 0 and thus permanently stimulate output.  Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) report
the following determinacy conditions for this model.
Proposition 1: Suppose that prices are set in a Calvo fashion (7) and that monetary
policy is given by (6). Under the mild assumption β+λ ≥ 1, all forward-looking rules (i =
1) are indeterminate.  With a current-looking interest rate rule (i=0) there is real
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With a backward-looking interest rate rule (i=-1) there is real determinacy if and only if
τ > 1.
Note that an aggressive (but not too aggressive) current-looking rule is determinate in this
environment.
3
Real Indeterminacy with Finite Stickiness.
One disadvantage of the Calvo model is that violates the NRH.  This is especially
troublesome for issues of determinacy: An equilibrium is determinate if perturbations
from the equilibrium path lead to explosive inflation dynamics, but surely the Calvo
pricing arrangement would not continue to hold along such a path. Calvo pricing implies
that there is some poor firm along these hyperinflationary paths that has never adjusted
prices despite the fact that prices have increased a million-fold!  In contrast, a NRH
model implies that at some finite date all firms will have adjusted their prices.  This
section demonstrates that the determinacy conditions in a NRH model of finite stickiness
are more stringent than in a Calvo model of forever stickiness.  This result that forever
                                                          
3 With investment, however, all current looking rules would be indeterminate.7
stickiness is different from finite stickiness is analogous to the folk theorem in game
theory: a game that lasts for a finite but known period of time is fundamentally different
from a game that lasts forever.
Assume that the counterpart to (7) is
 
= =
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where κi denotes the fraction of firms that set their time t prices in period t-i and N is the
number of periods for which prices are sticky.  There are many stories that could motivate
a similar Phillips curve including Fischer (1977), McCallum (1994), and Mankiw and
Reis (2001).  During the first N periods zt need not equal z  as the economy begins with
some established prices. But in contrast to Calvo (1983), this stickiness is finite: zt+j =
z for all j ≥ N.
From t+N onwards, therefore, the deterministic version of the model is
isomorphic to the flexible price model with a constant income tax rate of 1-z .  This
implies that a necessary condition for real determinacy is that the corresponding flexible
price model be determinate for real variables.  But this flexible price real determinacy is
only necessary.  For sufficiency we also need the corresponding flexible price economy to
have nominal determinacy.  This is because we need an extra condition to pin down
behavior.
To demonstrate this result, split time into the first N periods (periods t to t+N-1)
in which some prices are predetermined, and the rest of time in which the deterministic
dynamics are flexible-price. The Fisher equation is given by
                                                                                                                                                                            
 See Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000).8
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+ + + + + + + = − + j t j t j t j t z R z π   for j = 0,1,…N-2, (9a)
[ ] 0 ~ ~ ~
1 = − + + + − + N t N t N t R z π  and (9b)
0 ~ ~
1 1 = − + + + + j t j t R π  for all j ≥ N. (9c)
Suppose policy is given by a current or backward rule (the argument for a forward rule is
similar).  The pricing equation (8) provides N restrictions on the 2N variables
j t j t and z + + π ~ ~ for j = 0,1…N-1. After period N-1 this pricing equation is irrelevant.
Equation (9a) provides an additional N-1 restrictions.  Equation (9b) provides one
additional restriction on  , ~
1 − +N t z but also introduces another free variable  . ~
N t+ π The only
possible restriction on  N t+ π ~ would come from (9c), the flexible price world that dawns at
time t+N.  If there is nominal determinacy in this flexible price world then, by definition,
N t+ π ~ is determined and we have real determinacy in this sticky price model.  But (9c)
implies that there is both nominal and real determinacy if and only if policy is backward-
looking with τ > 1.  In summary, we have the following:
Proposition 2: Suppose that prices are set as in (8) and that monetary policy is given by
(6).  All forward-looking (i = 1) and current-looking rules (i = 0) are subject to real
indeterminacy.  With a backward-looking interest rate rule (i=-1) there is real
determinacy if and only if τ > 1.  More generally, in a world with finite stickiness, there is
real determinacy if and only if there is nominal determinacy in the corresponding flexible
price economy.
In a model with Calvo’s forever stickiness, indeterminacy can be avoided by
responding aggressively to current movements in inflation.  In contrast, in a NRH model
with finite stickiness any current-based policy is necessarily subject to sunspot9
fluctuations.  The only way to avoid indeterminacy is to respond aggressively to past
inflation.
IV.  Learning.
The implicit premise in the previous analysis is that central banks should avoid
rules that create indeterminacy because of the possibility of sunspot fluctuations.  But is
this argument reasonable?  Or are these sunspot equilibria simply an intellectual curiosity
with no empirical relevance?  This is of course not a simple question to answer, but one
mode of exploration is to ask if the equilibria are fragile under learning dynamics.  We
follow Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and interpret “learning” as E-stability, so that an
equilibrium is “fragile” if it is not E-stable.
4
Within a Calvo model, Honkapohja and Mitra (2001) demonstrate that the sunspot
equiliria are not E-stable for forward- or current-looking Taylor rules.  Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001c), however, utilize an alternative assumption about money demand timing
(CIA-timing) and show that there is a parameter range in which sunspots under a forward
rule are E-stable. In sharp contrast to these fairly narrow results for the Calvo model, this
section demonstrates that sunspot equilibria in the NRH model are almost always E-
stable. This difference between the Calvo and NRH models arises because the NRH
model includes lagged expectations and these lagged expectations produce a class of RE
sunspot equilibria that are more likely to be E-stable.
To examine E-stability we must introduce expectations operators.  In the case of
one-period stickiness (N=1), and a forward-based Taylor rule, the equilibrium condition
is given by the stochastic counterpart to (9a):
                                                          
4 E-stability typically implies that least-squares learning converges to the rational expectations equilibrium.10
0 ) 1 ( ) ~ ~ ( 1 1 2 = − − − + − − + + t t t t t t t u E E ρ π π λ π π τ (10)
where ut denotes some additive fundamental shock to the pricing equation (8) with ut =
ρut-1+εt, and εt is a mean-zero, iid shock.  There exist sunspot equilibria of the form
t t t t t f u f s s ε γ λγ π 2 1 1 1
~ + + + = − − (11)
where t s  is an iid, mean-zero sunspot shock, γ is an arbitrary constant, and the fi’s are
unique (assuming ρ ≠ 0).  Posit a perceived law of motion (PLM) that is of the same
form:
t t t t t d u c s b s a ε π 1 1 1 1 1 1
~ + + + = − − .
Using this PLM to replace all expectations in (10), we solve for the actual law of motion
(ALM) given by
[] . ) 1 ( ) ( )] 1 ( ) 1 ( [ ~
1 1
2
1 1 1 1 t t t t t c u c s b s b ε ρ τλρ λ ρ ρ τλρ λρ λ π − + − + − + − + + + = − −
We now have the implicit mapping from PLM to ALM.  The stability matrix for
this mapping has eigenvalues (0, 1, 1+λρ-τλρ
2, 0).  For E-stability we need all of these to
be less than one (because γ is arbitrary, one of the eigenvalues corresponding to the
sunspots can be unity).  Hence, we have E-stability of the equilibria if and only if τρ > 1.
Note that this restriction arises from the fundamental shocks so that the bound does
nothing to avoid the E-stability of the stationary sunspot equilibria.
In the case of a current rule, the sunspot equilibria are again of the form (11), and
the comparable stability condition is ρλ(1-τ) < 0.  As before this bound arises from the
fundamental shocks, so that the sunspot equilibria are E-stable.
In contrast, in the case of a backward rule, the sunspot equilibria are of the form11
t t t t t t f u f s s ε γ λγ π τ π 2 1 1 1 1
~ ~ + + + + = − − − (12)
with sunspots arising if and only if τ < 1.  The eigenvalues of the stability matrix are
(τλ+1,0, 1,1+λρ, 0) implying that the equilibria of the form (12) are not E-stable. The
fundamental equilibrium, however, is of the form
t t t g u g ε π 2 1 1
~ + = −
and is E-stable if and only if τ > ρ.  Hence, a backward Taylor rule with τ > 1 ensures
determinacy and E-stability of the fundamental equilibrium.
V.  Conclusion.
The central issue of this paper is to identify the restrictions on the Taylor interest
rate rule needed to ensure real determinacy in a model that satisfies the NRH.  In such a
model all forward and current-looking interest rate rules are subject to real indeterminacy
and the resulting sunspot equilibria are E-stable.  In contrast, an aggressive (τ > 1)
backward-looking rule ensures determinacy and E-stability of the fundamental
equilibrium.  This result generalizes to other models that satisfy the NRH.  For example,
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) examine a limited participation model and reach exactly the
same conclusions on the determinacy of an aggressive backward-looking Taylor rule.
The analysis in Section III suggests that this result will extend to any model with a finite
nominal rigidity.12
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